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Class Actions
by Thomas M. Byrne*
and Stacey McGavin Mohr**
After an uneventful 2013 on the class action front, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit tackled an assortment of class
action issues during 2014, which often required the court to navigate
around a recent wave of Supreme Court precedents affecting that area.
I.

MOOTNESS: PONDERING SYMCZYK

Courts have struggled for decades with the intersection of Article II1
mootness and class actions. The Supreme Court of the United States
recently seemed poised to resolve one long-festering issue in Genesis
HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk 2 but ultimately demurred? A sharply
divided Court instead held that if an unaccepted offer of judgment does
moot an individual claim, then the individual's would-be collective action
under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)4 is also
moot.5 The narrowly framed, 5-4 majority opinion by Justice Thomas
dodged what had seemed to be the central question presented by the
case: does an unaccepted offer pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure6 moot an individual claim?7 The Court acknowl* Partner in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Notre Dame (A.B., cune laude, 1978; J.D., magna cum laude, 1981). Law

clerk to the Hon. Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and to the Hon. Morey L. Sear of the United States District Court of the
Eastern District of Louisiana. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Atlanta, GA. Emory
University (B.A. 2001); Duke University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2007).
Law clerk to the Hon. Karen Nelson Moore of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013).
3. Id. at 1532.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2014).
5. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1531-32.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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edged the circuit split on this question but noted that all parties had
assumed in the lower courts that the answer to the question was yes. 8
So the Court assumed, without deciding, that Symczyk's individual claim
was mooted by an offer of judgment to which she did not reply.9
From that premise, the Court stated that whether the action remained
justiciable turned on "[a] straightforward application of well-settled
mootness principles."' ° The Court held that Symczyk lacked any
cognizable personal interest in representing others in the action." The
Court distinguished United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,2
which held that a named plaintiff, whose claim became moot after denial
of class certification, could still appeal the denial because there was a
decision on class certification to which the appeal could relate back while
the named plaintiff's claim was alive. 3 In Symczyk, there was not even
a conditional certification under FLSA to which to relate back.'4
Moreover, the Court held that "a putative class acquires an independent
legal status once it is certified under Rule 23."" 5 FLSA conditional
certification confers no such status, the Court explained, and only
authorizes the sending of notice to employees. 6 The Court also held
that Symczyk's claim was not of an "inherently transitory" nature, like
pretrial detention challenges, which warrant relating back to the filing
of the complaint. 7 Finally, the Court distinguished its decision in
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,'8 which held that named
plaintiffs who prevailed by offer of judgment (over their objection) could
still appeal the denial of certification."' The Court saw Roper both as
turning on its specific facts-in which the plaintiffs retained an economic
interest in shifting attorneys' fees and expenses to successful class
litigants-and as "tethered to the unique significance of certification

7. See Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1526.

8. Id. at 1528-29.
9. Id. at 1529.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
13. Id. at 404 n.ll.
14. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1530.
15. Id. A collective action differs from an ordinary class action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 in that each class member must decide, after being notified of the
action, whether or not to "opt-in." In an ordinary class action, the absent class members,
after receiving notice, must affirmatively exclude themselves, or "opt-out," to not be bound
by the class judgment. FED. R. CwV. P. 23.
16. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1530.
17. Id. at 1531.
18. 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
19. Id. at 340.

20151

CLASS ACTIONS

905

decisions in class-action proceedings."'
Justice Kagan's notably
brusque dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor,
took the majority to task for not deciding whether an unaccepted offer
of a full-relief judgment renders a claim moot.21
The Eleventh Circuit answered Symczyk's undecided question in 2014
as Justice Kagan advocated. The case was Stein v. Buccaneers Limited
Partnership." The six named plaintiffs brought a proposed nationwide
class action against the Tampa Bay National Football League team
alleging that they had received unsolicited faxes in violation of the
federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.2 After removal
of the case to federal district court, the defendant served each named
plaintiff with a Rule 684 offer of judgment. 25 The defendant promptly
moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground of
mootness. The plaintiffs responded by filing a motion for class
certification, which the district court denied as premature. The plaintiffs
did not accept the offers of judgment, and the stated deadline for
acceptance
passed. The district court then dismissed the case as
26
moot.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit identified two issues of first impression in the circuit: (1) whether an unaccepted offer of judgment that
would provide full relief to the plaintiff moots his individual claim; (2)
if so, and if the offer precedes a motion for class certification, whether
2
the plaintiff may go forward with class certificationY.
The court
concluded that to give controlling effect to an unaccepted Rule 68 offer
of judgment would be "flatly inconsistent with the rule."' The text of
the rule, the court reasoned, states its effect: An offer not accepted is
deemed withdrawn, and the plaintiff may proceed with the case.2 The
court noted that the four justices in Symczyk who reached the issue
"adopted precisely this analysis." 0 The court went on to note that
dismissal of the named plaintiffs' claims was entirely improper anyway,

20.
21.
22.
Robert
sitting
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1532.
Id. at 1532, 1537 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
772 F.3d 698 (11th Cir. 2014). The court's opinion was authored by District Judge
L. Hinkle of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida,
by designation. Id. at 700.
Id. at 700; 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1XC) (2012).
FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
Stein, 772 F.3d at 700.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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since Rule 68 would call for entry of judgment in accordance with the
offer, not dismissal.3 1
The court held, alternatively, that even if the offer of judgment
somehow rendered the individual claims moot, the class action claims
would remain live and the named plaintiffs would be permitted to
pursue them.3" The timing of the motion for class certification was
irrelevant.33 The court relied on a series of Supreme Court decisions,
beginning with Sosna v. Iowam and Gerstein v. Pugh,' for the principle that a class action may not be moot when individual claims become
view, whether the motion to
moot before certification. 6 In the court's
37
certify is filed first was not significant:
What matters is that the named plaintiff acts diligently to pursue the
class claims .... [A] named plaintiff need not file a class-certification
motion with the complaint or prematurely; it is enough that the named
plaintiff diligently takes any necessary discovery, complies with any
applicable local rules and scheduling orders, and acts without undue
38

delay.

In this respect, the court found there was no deficit in the Stein
plaintiffs' performance. 3' It further noted a circuit split on this issue
and sided with the majority of circuits reaching the question. ° Finally,
the court distinguished the Symczyk holding as applicable only to FLSA

31. Id. at 703.
32. Id. at 704.
33. Id. at 708.
34. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
35. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
36. Stein, 772 F.3d at 706-07.
37. Id. at 707.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 707-08. As the court explained, most other circuits addressing the issue have
held that "a Rule 68 offer of full relief to the named plaintiff does not moot a class action,
even if the offer precedes a class-certification motion, so long as the named plaintiff has not
failed to diligently pursue class certification." Id. at 707 (citing Pitts v. Terrible Herbst,
Inc., 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011); Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d
1239 (10th Cir. 2011); Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2008);
Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2004)). The Seventh Circuit, on the other
hand, while "recognizling] that an offer of full relief to a named plaintiff before a class is
certified does not always moot the case," held "that if the offer to the named plaintiff is
made before the plaintiff moves to certify a class, the named plaintiff cannot go forward."
Id. at 708 (citing Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011)). The Eleventh
Circuit noted that the decision in Darnascohas led to a common practice in the Seventh
Circuit of filing a premature certification motion with the complaint. Id.
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collective actions and not to Rule 23"' class actions, though it did note
some tension between its own holding and dicta in the majority
opinion."
Stein's approach sweeps a bit too broadly. Simply applying the text
of Rule 68 does not necessarily answer the Article III question posed by
an offer of complete surrender that a plaintiff rejects, as even the
Symczyk dissenters acknowledged.4 3 Litigating in federal district court
is a privilege not afforded to a plaintiff who will not take yes for an
answer. The court's alternative holding tackled the more difficult issues
of whether, assuming that an unaccepted offer of judgment can moot a
plaintiff's claim does it moot his putative class action and does the
answer depend on when the plaintiff moves for class certification?"
Here, the court acknowledged that its holding could be at odds with
Symczyk but concluded that the tension was not direct enough to
warrant the different result suggested by a former Fifth Circuit
precedent.4 5 The court's failure to cite, much less discuss, the Supreme
Court's decision in Roper-the decision seemingly most supportive of its
alternative holding-is intriguing. Nonetheless, whatever its blemishes,
Stein definitively resolves the Rule 68 mootness issue within the
Eleventh Circuit, at least until the Supreme Court returns to the
issue."' That return may be imminent, given that the Court recently
granted certiorari in a case that affords the Court an opportunity to
revisit the Symezyk mootness issue.4" The case will be argued during
the Court's October 2015 Term.
The Eleventh Circuit faced another class action mootness issue in
48
Lakeland Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Astellas US, LLC. The
49
plaintiff, a medical center, brought a putative Sherman Antitrust Act
class action against the manufacturer of a pharmaceutical product,
charging that the defendant unlawfully tied a patented right to perform

41. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
42. Stein, 772 F.3d at 708-09.
43. See Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1536 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
44. Stein, 772 F.3d at 704.
45. Id.; see generally Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.
1981).
46. The Eleventh Circuit has applied Stein in summary fashion in subsequent cases.
See Barr v. Harvard Drug Grp., LLC, 591 F. App'x 928 (1lth Cir. 2015); Barr v. Int'l Dental
Supply Co., 586 F. App'x 580, 581 (11th Cir 2014); Keim v. ADF Midatlantic, LLC, 586 F.
App'x 573, 574 (11th Cir. 2014).
47. Campbell-Edward Co. v. Gomez, No. 14-857, cert. granted, May 18, 2015.
48. 763 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2014). The opinion for the court was authored by Judge
David M. Ebel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by
designation. Id. at 1282.
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
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a cardiac test to the purchase of an unpatented drug.50 The would-be
class was defined to include all healthcare providers who purchased the
drug during a four-year period.5 1 The district court denied class
certification on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked antitrust standing
because of the direct purchaser requirement5 2 to bring a damages claim
and because the declaratory and injunctive relief claims were both moot
or insufficiently articulated.53 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
antitrust standing holding and reasoned that, given that the plaintiff
lacked standing, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the
plaintiff's bid to represent a damages class.54 Turning to the injunctive
and declaratory relief claims, the court, after noting that the direct
purchaser requirement did not preclude these claims, rejected the
district court's view that the claims became moot as a result of the Food
and Drug Administration's approval of a generic version of the drug.55
First, the court pointed out that the generic drug did not become
available during the time the case remained pending in the district court
and that there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that it had
become available subsequently.5" Second, the court found nothing in
the record to demonstrate what effect the generic drug's presence might
have in the marketplace.57 But the court nevertheless concluded that
the district court had not abused its discretion in denying class
certification of the declaratory and injunctive relief claims.5" Noting it
was the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that class certification of such
claims is appropriate under Rule 23(bX2), the court held that the
plaintiff had failed to carry that burden in two respects: first, by never
identifying exactly what injunctive or declaratory relief it was seeking;
and second, by failing to prove that whatever order it was seeking would
provide relief to each class member.59

50. Lakeland, 763 F.3d at 1283.
51. Id.
52. "Under the direct purchaser rule, only the customer who purchased the goods or

services at issue directly from the alleged antitrust violator can recover damages." Id. at
1285 (emphasis omitted).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1289.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1291-92.
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CAFA REMOVAL: APPLYING DART

In two 2014 decisions, the court considered whether removing
defendants had satisfied the $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement s ° established under the Class Action Fairness Act of 200562
(CAFA). 61 South Florida Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.
involved a claim on behalf of a class for declaratory relief only.63 The
plaintiff treated an Allstate insured who had personal injury protection
coverage in her auto policy. The plaintiff took an assignment of the
policy benefits and sought payment of 80% of the amount it had billed
the insured.6 4 Allstate instead paid 80% of certain amounts set out in
a statutory fee schedule. The plaintiff contended that Florida law
required any insurer adhering to that statutory fee schedule to state so
clearly and umambiguously in the policy. The requested declaration on
behalf of the class was that the language used in the Allstate policy did
not meet the statutory requirements. Allstate removed the case to
federal court under CAFA, supported by an affidavit showing that an
additional $68 million in policy benefits would be owed if the declaration
were entered. The plaintiff moved to remand because the complaint
itself did not seek damages and the financial consequences of a
declaratory judgment were too speculative. The district court agreed
and granted the motion to remand. Allstate appealed. 5
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that CAFA requires, for jurisdictional
purposes, that the amount in controversy presented by a request for
declaratory relief is the monetary value that would flow to the entire
class if the relief is granted.6 The court noted that the monetary value
must be "sufficiently measurable and certain" to establish the jurisdictional amount.67 Allstate, the court concluded, had carried its burden
of establishing the amount in controversy, and its affidavit of the

60. See Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909 (11th Cir. 2014); S. Fla. Wellness, Inc.
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 745 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012).
62. 745 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014).
63. Id. at 1313. The opinion for the court was authored by Chief Judge Ed Carnes. Id.
64. Id. at 1313-14. As the court explained, "The general rule for PIP [personal injury
protection] coverage in Florida is that an insurance policy must cover 80% of all reasonable
costs for medically necessary treatment resulting from an automobile accident, subject to
certain limits." Id. at 1314.
65. Id. at 1313-15.
66. Id. at 1316.
67. Id. (quoting Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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jurisdictional amount was unrebutted. 6' The plaintiff argued that
multiple events would have to occur to result in recovery of money from
Allstate in the event the class obtained its declaratory judgment. 9 The
court tartly responded that the assumption underlying this argument-that class members would not seek out the additional payment
after they obtained the declaratory judgment-was "contrary to human
nature and the nature of lawyers."7 ° The court further admonished
that "[e]stimating the amount in controversy is not nuclear science; it
does not demand decimal-point precision."7' The large size of the
calculated amount made it "easier ... to be confident that collection

contingencies should not count for much."72
The court's pragmatic approach to assessing the amount in controversy
should discourage gamesmanship in framing the prayer for relief, which
is consistent with the Supreme Court's CAFA precedents.73 South
FloridaWellness, Inc. suggests that a similar outcome would result from
of an attempt to certify a single issue under Rule
the valuation
74
23(cX4).
The second CAFA removal case, Dudley v.Eli Lilly & Co., 75 came
shortly after an important Supreme Court decision, Dart Cherokee Basin
Operating Co. v. Owens,76 which held that a removing defendant is not
required to attach or present evidence of the amount in controversy with
its notice of removal.77 Dart relieved decades of uncertainty concerning
the filing requirements for removal of cases to federal court from state
court by holding that a defendant is required only to file "a short and
plain statement" containing a "plausible allegation" that the jurisdictional amount in diversity cases is satisfied. 7' No evidence need be recited
in the notice or attached to it.79 The Court's ruling applies in all
diversity cases, including would-be class actions removed under CAFA.
Lack of uniformity in the case law and limited appellate review had
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. Id. at 1317.
72.

Id.

73. See, e.g., Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013) (refusing to give
effect to complaint's limitation of class damages).
74. See generally Laura J. Hines, The Unruly Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718
(2014).
75. 778 F.3d 909 (11th Cir. 2014). The opinion for the court was authored by Judge
Stanley Marcus. Id. at 910.
76. 135 S.Ct. 547 (2014).
77. Id. at 551.
78. Id. at 553-54.
79. Id. at 551.
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prompted some attorneys to file supporting affidavits with their removal
notices and to spend hours drafting code-pleading style "petitions for
removal." Dart makes clear that the notice of removal is governed by
federal notice-pleading standards.'0
In a holding specific to CAFA cases, the Supreme Court also rejected
any "presumption against removal," which the district court had
invoked: "We need not here decide whether such a presumption is proper
in mine-run diversity cases. It suffices to point out that no antiremoval
presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to
facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court." 1
Dudley was brought by a sales employee who claimed to be owed
certain incentive compensation. She sued on behalf of the class of
similarly situated employees. Lilly removed the case to the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida under CAFA.
The district court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand on the ground
that Lilly had not proven that the amount in controversy exceeds $5
The Eleventh Circuit
million, CAFA's jurisdictional threshold. 2
granted Lilly permission to appeals° under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). 4
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that Darthad overruled
circuit case law that had instructed that removal statutes were to be
strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of remand. 5 The
court held that any presumption in favor of remand was no longer
As in its pre-Dart cases, 7 the court
operative in CAFA cases.8 8
applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, noting that the
removing party bears the burden of proof's In attempting to prove the
jurisdictional amount, Lilly offered affidavits from a sales executive
concerning the sales incentive programs in question. The affidavits
stated the number of sales representatives eligible to receive incentive
payments and provided a range of the amounts potentially due. The
plaintiff challenged Lilly's proof by pointing out that not all employees
were eligible for all of the incentive payments and that Lilly failed to
show which payments would have been due to those who were eligible.8 9 The district court upheld this objection, and the Eleventh Circuit

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 555.
Id. at 554.
Dudley, 778 F.3d at 910-11.
Id. at 911.

84.

28 U.S.C. § 1453(cXl) (2012).

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Dudley, 778 F.3d at 912.
Id.
See, e.g., Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2006).
Dudley, 778 F.3d at 913.
Id. at 915.
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affirmed the district court's findings as not clearly erroneous.9 ° Lilly
countered that it should not have to concede liability at so early a stage
of the litigation or provide detailed, sale-by-sale proof as to each former
employee. 9' The Eleventh Circuit responded that it agreed with these
points but "we cannot see how the district court could generally infer the
amount in controversy from this record." 2 The court faulted Lilly for
not providing the district court with more information from its employment records about the amount of compensation allegedly denied the
class members, without conceding liability or being unduly burdened.93
The court pointedly noted that if the jurisdictional amount was
established later in the litigation, then another removal attempt could
be made.94
The case illustrates that, despite Dart, a removing defendant still
must provide a detailed evidentiary showing to withstand a motion to
remand, even in CAFA cases. 95 Depending on the class definition, this
showing may entail some discomfiture concerning possible admissions of
liability. Usually, these concerns can be addressed with express
reservations and denials of liability. Any concerns, moreover, must be
weighed against the disadvantages of proceeding in state court that
presumably prompted removal in the first place. Dudley also reminds
defendants of their lifeline: If the amount in controversy escalates or
becomes clearer later in the litigation, then the defendant may try again.
III.

CLASS CERTIFICATION: APPLYING HALLIBURTON H AND COMCAST

The Eleventh Circuit considered certification-related issues in cases
arising under the securities laws and in the consumer class action
context.9 6 In Local 703, I.B. of T Grocery & Food Employees Welfare
Fund v. Regions FinancialCorp.,7 the court considered an interlocutory appeal presenting several issues related to certification of a securitiesfraud class action,9 8 a subject of recent Supreme Court attention in

90. Id. at 915-16.
91. Id. at 917.
92. Id.
93. Id.

94. Id.
95. See id. at 912.
96. See Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp.,
762 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App'x
782 (11th Cir. 2014).
97. 762 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2014). The opinion of the court was authored by Judge
Beverly B. Martin. Id. at 1252.
98. Id. at 1252.
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Halliburton Co. v. Erica P John Fund, Inc. (HalliburtonI).99 In Local
703, the district court had certified a class action based on alleged
misrepresentations by Regions about its financial health before and
during the recent recession. The plaintiffs alleged that Regions's failure
to accurately represent the company's financial situation in statements
to analysts and in required disclosures resulted in an artificially high
stock price, allowing it to avoid the precipitous decline in stock price that
would have otherwise resulted during the recession. ° °
On Regions's appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first considered the
applicable standard for invocation of the presumption established by
Basic Inc. v. Levinson,' which allows plaintiffs a rebuttable presump10 2
tion of class-wide reliance based on the fraud-on-the-market theory.
To establish the presumption, plaintiffs must prove certain elements,
such as "that the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known...,
that the stock traded in an efficient market, and that the relevant
transaction took place between the time the misrepresentations were
made and the time the truth was revealed."'0 3 The district court found
that the plaintiffs met these requirements, but Regions argued on appeal
that the evidence was not sufficient to conclude that the stock traded on
an efficient market.'0 4 Regions argued that the court was required to
analyze market efficiency under the factors set out in Cammer v.
Bloom,' which has been approved by several other circuit courts.'06
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Regions that the plaintiffs had "not
established a comprehensive analytical framework for determining
whether the market for a particular stock is efficient," but it did not "see
this as a problem." 10 7 The court held,

99. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
100. Local 703, 762 F.3d at 1252.
101. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
102. Id. at 250. "According to that theory, the market price of shares traded on well-

developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material
misrepresentations." Local 703, 762 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co. (HalliburtonI), 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). "The theory thus allows us to presume 'that an investor relies on public
misstatements whenever he buys or sells stock at the price set by the market.'" Id.
(quoting Halliburton1, 131 S. Ct. at 2185).
103. Local 703, 762 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2185).
104. Id. at 1252.
105. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
106. Local 703, 762 F.3d at 1255; see, e.g., In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623,634
n.16 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that seven of the twelve Circuit Courts have done so).
107. Local 703, 762 F.3d at 1254.
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By not setting forth a mandatory framework, we have given District
Courts the flexibility to make the fact-intensive inquiry on a case-bycase basis. Beyond that, the flexible approach will allow District
Courts in the future to consider new factors yet unknown to this Court
that market theorists might consider to indicate market efficiency.1"8
The court noted, however, that it has given guidance, identifying "some
major, general characteristics of an efficient market," such as "highvolume trading activity facilitated by people who analyze information
about the stock or who make trades based upon that information," but
that those characteristics may not be required in every case. 109 The
court also made clear that although it has rejected use of Cammer's
factors as mandatory, district courts are free to apply them."'
The court also rejected Regions's argument that invocation of the
presumption "always requires proof that the alleged misrepresentations
had an immediate effect on the stock price.""' In some cases, confirmatory information will not cause a change in the stock price, but will
instead merely slow down its decline. 1 ' While the court agreed that
there is no per se rule that stocks traded 3on a national market are
traded on an efficient market, it is a factor.11
The court-as well as all parties-did agree, however, that remand was
proper in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in HalliburtonII,
which made clear that defendants may introduce price impact evidence
at the class certification stage, both to undermine the plaintiff's case for
market efficiency and to rebut the Basic presumption once it has been
established." 4 Because the district court did not fully consider this
evidence under the state of the law pre-HalliburtonII, the court ordered
a limited remand so that the district court may consider price evidence,
although "HalliburtonH by no means holds that in every case in which
such evidence is presented, the presumption will always be defeated,"
particularly when the case involves confirmatory information." 5
Turning to typicality, the court noted that this requirement "may be
satisfied despite substantial factual differences ... when there is a

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1254-55.
1255.
1256.
1257.
1258.
1259.
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strong similarity of legal theories.""' The court specifically rejected
Regions's arguments that the various class representatives were not
typical because one plaintiff sold some of its stock at the inflated prices
during the class period and made post-disclosure purchases while the
other plaintiff bought shares late in the class period and retained shares
long after the corrective disclosure." 7 The court agreed with the Fifth
Circuit that "[r]eliance on the integrity of the market prior to disclosure
of alleged fraud (i.e. during the class period) is unlikely to be defeated
The
by post-disclosure reliance on the integrity of the market."'
court did note, however, that the greater the time between the purchase
and the sale, the more likely it is that different factors caused the loss,
which the district court could revisit on remand." 9 The court rejected
the argument that the use of investment advisers rendered the plaintiffs
atypical, noting that large institutional investors, who are more likely
120
to use investment advisers, are preferred as class representatives.
It stated, "Even sophisticated investment advisers ... rely on the
integrity of the market ... even if they do not incorporate 21particular
informational disclosures into their investment strategies."'
Regions also argued that the district court erred in establishing the
class period. 122 The court rejected the argument that the class period
cannot begin with the filing of the 2007 Form 10-K when plaintiffs do
not allege any wrongdoing in 2007.123 "All of Regions's conduct in 2007
may be perfectly innocent, but if it misrepresented the value of its 2007
assets in 2008, then it would have violated the Securities Exchange Act,
and the class period can begin at that time on that basis."124 The
court did, however, offer Regions a small consolation by concluding that
the district court erred in establishing the end date for the class period

116. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d
1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009)). The court's reiteration of this statement is consistent with
its precedents, but it arguably is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation, in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), of the overlapping Rule 23(a)(2)
requirement of commonality. An allegation of the same legal theory does little to establish
commonality under the Dukes regime and seems unlikely to do much to establish typicality
either.
117. Local 703, 762 F.3d at 1260.
118. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Feder v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 429 F.3d 125,
138 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id. at 1260 & n.8. Loss causation is an element of a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud
claim under Dura Pharmaceutical,Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
120. Local 703, 762 F.3d at 1260.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1261.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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as January 20, 2009-based on the record, people who purchased shares
on January 20 should be excluded because125the corrective disclosure was
made before the market opened that day.
Although the grant of class certification was vacated and remanded,
Local 703 makes clear that district courts continue to have flexibility in
evaluating class-wide reliance in securities-fraud actions. Indeed, on
remand, the district court found that the price-impact evidence,
considered in light of Halliburton H, did not change the analysis and
again certified the class, although this time with the class period ending
Local 703 also demonstrates that the abuse-ofJanuary 19.126
obstacle to appellate
discretion review standard remains a meaningful
27
relief in class actions in the Eleventh Circuit. 1
In Bussey v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc.,128 the Eleventh
Circuit considered other aspects of Rule 23: ascertainability and
predominance. 1 29 Bussey, which is unpublished, 13 involved a putative class action by electronic bingo players against the operator of a
gaming facility and the manufacturers, owners, and operators of the
gaming machines, seeking to recover money lost while playing the
machines, which they alleged were illegal under Alabama law." 1 The
district court certified a class of "[aill persons who, at any time during
the period . . ., while using their Q-Club cards, lost money or value
13 2
playing electronic 'bingo' at Macon County Greyhound Park.'
Although all defendants asked for permission to appeal under Rule 23(f),
the court granted appeal only to the game manufacturers, concluding
that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the class was
ascertainable and that common issues predominated.' 33
The mechanics of the use and tracking of the gaming machines is
relevant to these issues. To play the gaming machines, a customer had
to insert a stored-value card or ticket, but the customer also could, but
was not required to, insert a "Q-Card," which had no value but tracked
use by specific customers for various bonuses and perks. Although a QCard was tied to a specific person, others could use someone's card, and

125. Id.

126. Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp.,
No. CV 10-J-2847-S, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162403, at *7, *31 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2014).
127. See Local 703, 762 F.3d at 1253.
128. 562 F. App'x 782 (11th Cir. 2014).
129. Id. at 787-88.
130. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent,
but they may be cited as persuasive authority.").
131. Bussey, 562 F. App'x at 784.
132. Id.

133. Id. at 784, 788.
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customers with cards, including the named plaintiffs, often did not use
them when playing. The gaming facility tracked players' wins and
losses through an "Advantage Tracking System," but the system would
have win/loss data for a particular individual only if he had used his QCard, and the system only showed wins and losses for a full session, not
per game. Another spreadsheet showed, for each Q-Card user, the total
amount lost on each manufacturer's machines, but payments to the
gaming facility by each manufacturer were not based on wins and losses
or tied to Q-Card use134
Turning to Rule 23, the court noted that although not mentioned in
the rule, it is implicit in the analysis that the proposed class be
"adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.A 35 "An identifiable
class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective
criteria. 1 36 Ascertainability also must be "administratively feasible,"
meaning that "identifying class members is a manageable process that
does not require much, if any, individual inquiry."' 3 ' Here, the class,
as defined, was not ascertainable because it included Q-Card holders
who had losses at a game level, even if not at a session level, but the
only session-level losses, requiring refining of
reports generated showed
138
the class definition.
Moreover, the district court's finding of predominance was an abuse
of discretion in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend,139 which was decided two days before the district
court opinion. '" According to Bussey, Comcast "reiterated that class
certification is an evidentiary question, not just an analysis of the
pleadings."14 ' The district court must conduct a "rigorous analysis,"
which frequently will "overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's
underlying claim." '42 Here, although the district court acknowledged
the Comcast decision, "it nonetheless failed to conduct the 'rigorous
analysis' required by that decision-instead deferring resolution of
important questions bearing on the class certification analysis to the
merits stage of the case."14 3 Specifically, the "shortcomings in the

134.
135.
2012)).
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 784-86.
Id. at 787 (quoting Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir.
Id. (quoting Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., Inc, 263 F.R.D. 90, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 788.
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
Bussey, 562 F. App'x at 790.
Id.
Id. (quoting Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432).
Id.
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data" bear directly and significantly on the predominance issue. 44 The
plaintiffs identified no method for quantifying game-level losses, which
is what they were seeking, and they identified no method for allocating
damages among the manufacturers and the facility because damages
were not tied to individual sessions or Q-Cards.4
The Eleventh
Circuit noted that "lilt remains unclear, therefore, how the district court
would ever be able to allocate liability and damages among the various
defendants." 4" The court therefore remanded for a new class definition and for the district court to conduct the required rigorous analysis
"regarding whether calculation of the class members' damages would
necessitate such individual inquiry that individual issues would
predominate over common ones," noting that the district court "may wish
to allow some discovery on the damages issue." 4 7
Although unpublished, Bussey reaffirms the rigor of the predominance
analysis, as well as the importance of ascertainability, even if a foray
into the merits is required. The case may be a prelude to a precedential
ruling on the ascertainability requirement, the application of which is a
subject of some controversy,4 in a future decision. District courts
should allow ample discovery and conduct a close examination of the
evidence, both on how class membership will be established and how
individual claims will be proven.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. "concluding that plaintiffs' expert's model for damages 'falls far short of
establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis,' and finding
that '[qluestions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions
common to the class'" (quoting Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433).
147. Id. at 791 & n.8.
148. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15553, at *5-6 (3d
Cir. May 2, 2014) (Ambro, J., dissenting) ("Even if, as I believe, the ability to identify class
members is a set piece for Rule 23 to work, how far we go in requiring plaintiffs to prove
that ability at the outset is exceptionally important and requires a delicate balancing of
interests. It merits not only en banc review by our Court but also review by the Judicial
Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure."), noting the substantial
controversy regarding the application of the court's decision on ascertainability in Marcus
v. BMW of North America, LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2012). The nature and
extent of an implied ascertainability requirement is one issue pending before the Ninth
Circuit in Jones v. ConAgra Foods,Inc., appeal docketed, No. 14-16327 (9th Cir. July 15,
2014). In Jones, the district court denied certification of a consumer class in part based on
a broad application of an independent ascertainability requirement. No. C 12-01633 CRB,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81292, at *45 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014).
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IV. ARBITRATION: APPLYING COMPUCREDIT AND ITALIAN COLORS
The Eleventh Circuit continued to examine the relationship between
the class mechanism and contractually selected arbitration, which is now
commonplace in employment and consumer agreements. In Walthour v.
Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 14 9 the court held that, under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),' 50
an arbitration agreement that
waives an employee's ability to bring a collective action under the FLSA
is enforceable.151 The plaintiffs, who were former employees, entered
into separate, identical arbitration agreements at the time of employment, which provided that any employment dispute would be submitted
to binding arbitration and any claims could be brought only individually
and not as a class. The agreement explicitly recognized that employees
were giving up their rights to participate in a class or other representative action. When the plaintiffs sued under the minimum wage,
overtime, and records provisions of the FLSA, the defendants filed a
motion to compel arbitration and dismiss or, alternatively, to stay the
proceedings pending arbitration. The district court granted the motions
and dismissed the complaint.'5 2
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the liberal federal policy in
favor of arbitration embodied in the FAA, stating that courts must
"rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,
including terms that specify with whom [the parties] choose to arbitrate
their disputes."'5 3 Because there was no question regarding the scope
and applicability of the agreements at issue, the FAA standing alone
would require individual, not collective, arbitration. 5 4 The plaintiffs
argued, however, that the agreements were an unenforceable waiver of
rights under FLSA § 16(b), overriding the FAA.' 55
In rejecting this argument, the court began with the proposition that
the FAA's requirement can be overridden by contrary congressional
intent, where a statute "evince[es] an intention to preclude a waiver of
[collective]-action procedure," 56 as laid out by the Supreme Court in

149. 745 F.3d 1326 (lth Cir. 2014). The opinion of the court was authored by Judge
Frank M. Hull. Id. at 1327.
150. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2014).
151. Walthour, 745 F.3d at 1327.
152. Id. at 1328-29.
153. Id. at 1329-30 (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013)).
154. Id. at 1330.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1331 (alterations in original) (quoting Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at
2309) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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1 57 and, more
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant
58
recently, in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, which determined
there was no contrary congressional command in the antitrust laws or
in the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA),'59 respectively.16 °
As the Eleventh Circuit noted, the Supreme Court in CompuCreditheld
that the CROA did not preclude enforcement of an arbitration agreement
"[blecause the CROA is silent on whether claims under the Act can
The Court's opinion did not
proceed in an arbitrable forum." ''
consider the legislative history or any inherent conflict between the
CROA and the FAA, but instead "relied on the text of the CROA,"162
noting that when Congress had previously prohibited arbitration clauses,
"it ha[d] done so with a clarity that far exceeds the claimed indications
in the CROA." 16 3 CompuCredit therefore "suggests that the Supreme
Court would focus primarily on the statutory text of the FLSA to
determine whether that text precludes a waiver of the statutory right to
"Indeed, '[iun every case the Supreme
bring a collective action."'
a statutory right that does not explicitly
involving
considered
Court has
5
'

preclude arbitration, it has upheld the application of the FAA. "1

Turning to the text of the FLSA, the Eleventh Circuit examined
section 16(b),166 which provides that an employee may bring an action
"for and in behalf of himself. . . and other employees similarly situated." "67
' The court focused on the fact that "an action brought by a
plaintiff employee does not become a 'collective' action unless other
plaintiffs affirmatively opt into the class by giving written and filed
consent,"1 68 also noting that "the right" provided by section 16(b) "shall

157. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
158. 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1616 (2014).

160. See Walthour, 745 F.3d at 1331.
161. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 673).
162.
163.

Id.; see also CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 672-73.
Walthour, 745 F.3d at 1331 (alteration in original) (quoting CompuCredit, 132 S.

Ct. at 672). The concurring justices further observed there was "nothing in the legislative
history or purpose" of the CROA that would preclude enforcement. Id. (quoting
CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 675 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
164. Id. at 1331-32.
165. Id. at 1332 (alteration in original) (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d
344, 357 n.8 (5th Cir. 2013)).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2014).
167. Id.
168. Walthour, 745 F.3d at 1332 (quoting Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs.,
Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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terminate if the Secretary of Labor files a complaint" under specified
sections. 69
Moreover, the collective action language of section 16(b) was expressly
adopted in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), v°
which was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hoffman-La Roche Inc.
72
Gilv. Sperling17 ' and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.'
mer, specifically, involved the enforceability of an arbitration agreement
"and speaks somewhat more to the issue here."173 Because the plaintiff in Gilmer "conceded that nothing in the text of the ADEA or its
legislative history explicitly precluded arbitration," the Court looked at
whether "compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims was 'inconsistent with
the statutory framework and purposes of the ADEA."" " The Court
"found no inherent inconsistency between (1) enforcing arbitration
agreements as to ADEA claims and (2) the ADEA's important social
policies concerning promoting employment of older persons and
prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination." 175 The plaintiff in Gilmer
also argued, among other things, that arbitration procedures cannot
adequately further the purposes of the ADEA because they do not
provide for class actions. 176 Although the Court concluded that the
arbitration rules that would apply to Gilmer would provide for collective
proceedings, it opined that even assuming enforcement of the arbitration
agreement would result in parties forgoing proceeding collectively, "the
fact that the ADEA provides for the possibility of bringing a collective
action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were
intended to be barred."1 7 ' The Court also rejected the argument that
arbitration agreements related to ADEA claims were unenforceable due
178
to unequal bargaining power between employees and employers.
The Court later relied on Gilmer in Italian Colors Restaurant, rejecting
claims that the waiver of class arbitration barred "effective vindication"
of federal statutory rights under antitrust laws by removing plaintiffs'
economic incentive to bring claims, because an individual plaintiff could

169. Id.
170. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2014).
171. 493 U.S. 165 (1989).
172. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
173. Walthour, 745 F.3d at 1333.
174. Id. (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27).
175. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27).
176. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30, 32).
177. ld. (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court, in Gilmer, also noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
would still be able to bring actions for class-wide relief. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
178. Walthour, 745 F.3d at 1333.

922

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

still pursue its own statutory remedies." 9 Italian Colors Restaurant
reaffirmed that the Court in Gilmer "had no qualms in enforcing a class
waiver in an arbitration agreement even though the federal statute at
issue, the [ADEA] expressly permitted collective actions."18 °
Examining "the FLSA's text, legislative history, purposes, and these
Supreme Court decisions," the Eleventh Circuit found "no 'contrary
congressional command' that precludes the enforcement of plaintiffs'
Arbitration Agreements and their collective action waivers," citing six
separate, although overlapping grounds.'
First, the FLSA contains
no explicit provision preventing arbitration or the right to a collective
action under § 16(b).18 2 Second, the Supreme Court has already
rejected a similar argument in Gilmer, and because the ADEA adopts
the collective action provisions of the FLSA, "[t]he Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer, as interpreted by Italian Colors Restaurant, ...
applies with equal force to the FLSA."18 ' Accordingly, the Court
stated, "[T]he text of FLSA § 16(b) does not set forth a non-waivable
substantive right to a collective action."'" The court agreed with the
Eighth Circuit that even if there were some "right" to collective actions
created by the FLSA, the fact that a plaintiff must affirmatively opt in
to any such action meant that "surely the employee has the power to
waive participation in a class action as well." 85
Third, the FLSA legislative history does not indicate that the collective
action provision is essential to the effective vindication of the FLSA's
rights.'86 Fourth, enforcement of collective action waivers in arbitration agreements is not inconsistent with the FLSA 8 ' Fifth, all of the
circuits to address the issue have concluded that § 16(b) does not permit
a non-waivable, substantive right to a collective action.'8 8 Finally, the
court did not find it significant that Congress explicitly provided for the
right to bring a collective action in the FLSA rather than leaving it to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

179. Id. at 1334.
180. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2311)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1335.

184. Id.
185. Id. (quoting Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2013)).

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1336 (citing the Second, Eighth, Fifth, and Fourth Circuits).
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Congress's decision to specifically include the procedural right to a
collective action in the FLSA does not somehow transform that
procedural right into a substantive right. Rather than expand a
plaintiff's substantive rights, Congress's decision to enact the collective
action provision actually limited a plaintiff's existing procedural rights
set forth in Rule 23. Were it not for § 16(b), a plaintiff could bring a
representative FLSA action even without the prior consent of similarly
situated employees."S

The court addressed the Supreme Court's 1945 decision, Brooklyn
Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 9' which held that a plaintiff cannot waive the
right to liquidated damages in an FLSA settlement when there is no
genuine dispute that the plaintiff is entitled to them.191
O'Neil
addressed the waiver of a substantive right-the right to recover
liquidated damages for FLSA violations-but this case addresses only the
waiver of a litigation mechanism-the right to bring a collective action on
behalf of others.' 92
Although the Eleventh Circuit, following the Supreme Court, has
broadly enforced arbitration agreements in recent years, the court
continues to require that parties raise arbitration rights early in
litigation or risk waiver.'93
In In re Checking Account Overdraft
Litigation,' the court held that by waiting too long to invoke it, the
defendant, KeyBank, waived the arbitration agreement's "delegation
clause," which directed that the arbitrator would decide the validity of
the arbitration agreement. 9 ' After the plaintiff, a bank customer,
sued for excessive overdraft fees, KeyBank asked the district court to

189. Id.
190. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
191. Walthour, 745 F.3d at 1336-37; see also O'Neill, 324 U.S. at 706.
192. Walthour, 745 F.2d at 1337. Note that at least one other circuit has limited this
analysis to FLSA collective-action waivers in arbitration agreements. In Killion v. KeHE
Distributors,LLC, the Sixth Circuit invalidated a collective-action waiver contained in a
severance agreement, noting that it was not part of an arbitration agreement and
distinguishing Walthour and other circuit decisions on that basis. 761 F.3d 574, 591-92
(6th Cir. 2014).
193. One narrow exception, adopted by the court in Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., is
when the plaintiff files an amended complaint that "unexpectedly changes the scope or
theory of the plaintiffs claims," which may revive a previously waived right to compel
arbitration. 654 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2011). Krinsk is analyzed in the 2011 survey.
See Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey McGavin Mohr, Class Actions, 2011 Eleventh Circuit
Survey, 63 MERCER L. REv. 1183, 1190-91 (2012).
194. Johnson v. KeyBank National Ass'n (In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 754
F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2014). The opinion of the court was authored by Judge Stanley
Marcus. Id. at 1291.
195. Johnson, 754 F.3d at 1291-92.
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compel arbitration in accordance with his deposit agreement but failed
to raise the delegation clause.196 The district court refused to enforce
the arbitration agreement as unconscionable, but the Eleventh Circuit
vacated and remanded that decision in light of recent Supreme Court
and circuit precedent. 197 On remand, KeyBank raised the delegation
clause for the first time, arguing that the district court never should
have conducted the threshold inquiry of arbitrability. After a hearing,
the district court granted KeyBank's renewed motion to compel
arbitration, ordering arbitration on the question of arbitrability.'98
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that two of its prior decisions,
Barras v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.199 and Hough v. Regions
FinancialCorp. 200 both of which arose out of the same multidistrict
litigation as the present case,"0 1 compelled the conclusion that KeyIn all three
Bank waived enforcement of the delegation clause. 2
cases, the bank made no mention of a delegation clause in its initial
motion to compel arbitration and raised the issue only after an initial,
unfavorable unconscionability ruling from the district court. 0 3
The Eleventh Circuit first rejected KeyBank's argument that it should
review the district court's factual findings for clear error and infer
unstated factual findings consistent with the court's decision, because
the summary-judgment-like nature of a motion to compel arbitration
requires de novo review.20 4 Turning to the merits, the court reiterated
that waiver of arbitration rights occurs when a party substantially
participates in litigation to a point inconsistent with an intent to
arbitrate, resulting in prejudice to the opposing party 0 5 The court
reviewed the binding decisions in Barras and Hough-where the banks

196. Id. at 1292.
197. Id. at 1292-93 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011);
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,
648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011)). The Court in Rent-A-Center held that where an
arbitration agreement contains a delegation clause, challenges to the enforceability of the
agreement as a whole are for the arbitrator. 561 U.S. at 71-72. Cruz, and its interpretation of Concepcion, are analyzed in the 2011 survey. See Byrne & Mohr, supra note 194,
at 1187-90.
198. Johnson, 754 F.3d at 1293.
199. 685 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012).
200. 672 F.3d 1224(l1th Cir. 2012). Both Barrasand Hough are discussed in the 2012
survey. See Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey McGavin Mohr, Class Actions, 2011 Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 64 MERCER L. REV. 873, 884-87 (2013).
201. Johnson, 754 F.3d at 1294.
202. Id. at 1295.
203. Id. at 1294-95.
204. Id. at 1294.
205. Id.
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were "similarly situated" and "waived similar delegation clause
arguments"2 °6-and concluded this case is "materially indistinguishable
from Barras and Hough, and the two-pronged Morewitz waiver analysis
yields the same result here."" 7 The court rejected KeyBank's various
attempts to distinguish Barras and Hough, including the argument that
while KeyBank raised the delegation clause in a Rule 62.1208 motion
during its pending appeal, the banks in the previous cases waited to
raise the clause until after their first motions to compel were appealed
and remanded. 2 9 Because, however, the clause was not raised until
"after [the plaintiff] had borne the costs of contesting the initial motion
to compel arbitration and after KeyBank had engaged the apparatus of
appeal," the plaintiff was prejudiced by "the expense of twice fighting the
unconscionability battle in federal court."2 10
The court also refused to enforce an arbitration agreement in
Billingsley v. Citi Trends, Inc.211 Billingsley involved claims under the
FLSA for which the defendant argued collective-action rights had been
waived in the employees' arbitration agreements. The district court,
however, refused to enforce the agreements, finding that the defendant
improperly coerced potential opt-in plaintiffs, who were current
employees, to sign arbitration agreements after the litigation was
pending. 12 Citing the district court's "broad authority ...to manage
parties and counsel in an FLSA collective action," the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. 213

206. Id.
207. Id. at 1295.
208. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1.
209. Johnson, 754 F.3d at 1297-98. The court also rejected KeyBank's argument that
the earlier remand for consideration of Rent-A-Center, Concepcion, and Cruz had compelled
a particular result below, and further concluded that Rent-A-Center did not work an
intervening change in the law that would annul any waiver. Id. at 1296-97. This
conclusion is consistent with Garciav.Wachovia Corp., where the court concluded that the
intervening Concepcion decision did not revive a previously waived right to arbitration.
Garcia,699 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Byrne & Mohr, supra note 201, at
881-82.
210. Johnson, 754 F.3d at 1298. On remand, the district court again found the
arbitration agreement to be substantively unconscionable, even when not considering the
class action waiver as instructed by Concepcion. In re Checking Account Overdraft
Litigation, - F. Supp. 3d -,No. 1:10-CV-21176-JLK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13570, at *2627 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2015).
211. 560 F. App'x 914(11th Cir. 2014). The opinion of the court was authored by Judge
Frank M. Hull. Id. at 915.
212. Id. at 915, 919.
213. Id. at 922, 924.

